HARVARD GRADUATES.

Class of	From Massachusetts.	New England outside of Massachusetts.	Outside of New England.	Total.
1893	34	1	19	54
1894	30	2	17	49
1895	32	4	13	49
1896	23	7	17	47
1897	27	2	15	44
1898	42	1	25	68

GRADUATES OF OTHER COLLEGES.

Class of	From Massachusetts.	New England outside of Massachusetts.	Outside of New England.	Total.
1893	5	9	21	35
1894	7	20	38	65
1895	8	14	30	52
1896	14	11	45	70
1897	9	12	56	77
1898	19	23	62	104

HOLDING NO DEGREE.

Class of	From Massachusetts.	New England outside of Massachusetts.	Outside of New England.	Total.	Total of Class.
1893	4	1	7	12	101
1894	20	1	10	31	142
1895	16	3	14	33	135
1896	10	4	9	23	140
1897	26	7	16	49	170
1898	25	2	25	52	224

A glance at these tables shows several interesting facts. Most noticeable of all is the increase in the number of Harvard graduates, there being 24 more than last year in the first year class. There are also 27 more graduates of other Colleges than last year, while the number of students who do not hold academic degrees is increased by only three, a circumstance which speaks well for the high standard maintained in the School.

Next to Harvard, Yale send the most graduates to the class of 1898, there being 21 in all, the largest number ever in one class. Yale sent but 8 last year. Brown sends 11, Williams 9, Amherst and Princeton each 5, and Dartmouth 4. Leland Stanford, Bowdoin, and Trinity send 3 each, while six different Colleges send 2 apiece. Twenty-eight have each one representative in the first year class. The total number of educational institutions from which the class is drawn is 44. There are 87 whose homes are not in New England, and who have received no degree from Harvard, an increase of 9 over last year. All these figures are encouraging, as they point to a steady widening of the influence of the School.

FACTORS ACTS AGAIN. — While the courts have treated the general subject of alienation of real estate in a broad and liberal spirit, in cases of personalty, on the other hand, whether as a matter of common law development or of statutory construction, they have resisted any attempts to encourage commercial interests at the cost of private rights. The extremes to which the doctrines of conversion have been carried, where, on the Continent, ownership has long ago given way to the exigencies of trade, is one instance. Another is the untiring opposition of the courts

to the Factors Acts, — an opposition which crops out in almost every case on the subject, and of which *Prentice Co.* v. *Page* (41 N. E. R. 279), a Massachusetts case, furnishes an example. A swindler, by false representations and forged certificates (arts which subsequently secured his conviction for larceny), managed to obtain goods from the Prentice Company, which he palmed off upon a purchaser for value without notice. This result he had accomplished by assuring the Prentice Company that he had already made contracts for the goods as their agent, and that he wished simply to complete the sales by delivery. Under these circumstances, and under a Factors Act that protected purchasers from agents "intrusted with the possession of merchandise or of a bill of lading, consigning merchandise to him for the purpose of sale," the court decided that the word "sale" did not include a completed sale, and that a man intrusted with goods for the purpose of fulfilling a contract of sale was not a man intrusted "for the purpose of sale."

In England in *Baines* v. *Swainson* (4 B. & S. 27) and *Shepard* v. *Bank* (7 H. & N. 661), the opposite result was reached. The court attempts to distinguish these cases by pointing out that in the English Factors Acts the provision is simply that the goods shall be "intrusted," and not, the court says, "as ours, 'intrusted for sale.'" It is noticeable, however, that in the Massachusetts act the phrase "for the purpose of sale" occurs only in connection with the bill of lading, and not with the merchandise. The court then tries to discredit *Baines* v. *Swainson* by quoting Blackburn, J., in *Cole* v. *Bank* (L. R. 10 C. P. 354, 373, 374), to the effect that Willes, J. in delivering judgment in *Fuentes* v. *Montis* (L. R. 3 C. P. 268), "speaks of *Baines* v. *Swainson* as going to the extreme of the law." Yet on page 280 of L. R. 3 C. P. Willes, J. says, "The case of *Baines* v. *Swainson*, to which I entirely assent."

Another ground on which the court rests its decision is the larceny by the agent. "It would be a contradiction in terms to say that goods are intrusted for sale to one who steals them." That, however, is by no means perfectly clear. Larceny by trick is not at all inconsistent with persuading the owner to intrust goods to a rascal. The crime or fraud may render the guilty party punishable; but as Martin, B. said, in answer to a similar position taken in *Shepard* v. *Bank* (7 H. & N. 661, at 665), "he does not, however, the less intrust." Looked at from the point of view of this anomalous species of larceny, this *ratio decidendi* also seems hardly satisfactory.

ADMISSION TO THE BAR. — The General Council of the Quebec Bar is considering the advisability of admitting to practice, without examination, all who present diplomas from any law school in the Province. This suggests the query as to whether such a scheme is likely ever to secure general adoption. Perhaps it may not be universally known that in several of our States it already prevails. In Louisiana, Mississippi, West Virginia, and Wisconsin, the diploma of the law department of the State University is acceped in lieu of examination; in Georgia, two law schools are thus recognized; while in Illinois and Tennessee diplomas from any law school in the State, and in Indiana from any law school whatever, entitle their holders to admission to the bar. There is doubtless much to be said both for and against this policy. One who recalls the weeks of laborious memorizing, terminating in the severe mental strain of many consecutive hours of thinking and writing